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Abstract
Corruption is thought to affect developed economies to a greater degree than developing countries. However, given our
limited capacity to detect corruption, it may simply be harder to detect it in countries with stronger institutions. This arti-
cle sets out to address this measurement challenge and to offer a tailored approach to one particular type of corruption:
high-level corruption in government contracting. We describe a recently developed method to score procurement con-
tracts for corruption risk. Then, using micro-level data from Hungary and the Czech Republic we analyze how corruption
can distort public procurementmarkets, mapped as networks of buyers and suppliers. Proxying for corruption using a com-
posite index of red flags derived from contract awards, we find that public sector buyers with high corruption risk have
sparser network neighborhoods, meaning that they contract with fewer suppliers than expected. We interpret our results
as evidence that corruption in procurement markets is fundamentally about the exclusion of non-favored firms. Political
change has a significant effect on corrupt relationships: High corruption risk buyers with sparse neighborhoods rewire their
contracting relationships roughly 20–40%more extensively than other buyers across years with government turnover. The
article demonstrates how the political organization of corruption distorts market competition in OECD countries.
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1. Introduction
Evidence that corruption is detrimental to human well-
being and economic growth is robust both in high-
and low-income countries (Hessami, 2014). Empirical re-
search on corruption has too often neglected that its
social cost can vary substantially depending on its ‘in-
dustrial organization’ (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993), in other
words, the same level of corruption may imply differ-
ent corruption costs (Blackburn & Forgues-Puccio, 2009).
For example, if firms compete on cost including bribes,
the positive impact of competition on productivitywould
remain. If firms are excluded from the market and cor-
rupt firms do not need to compete, social costs will com-
pound over time (Aidt, 2016).
This difference becomes more salient when consid-
ering more recent framings of corruption as favoritism
and the exclusion of groups in the allocation of public re-
sources (North, Wallis, & Weingast, 2009). Rather than
considering corruption as a transactional tax, this per-
spective indicates how politics may shape procurement
market structure through corruption. It emphasizes that
corruption is shaped by institutions and political contes-
tation (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015).
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While there is an extensive academic literature on
the macro impacts of corruption on issues such as bud-
get composition (Mauro, 1998), less is known about how
corruption distorts markets (Olken, 2007). The structure
of procurement data, consisting of transacting buyers
and suppliers, makes it possible to quantify market struc-
ture using the tools of network analysis. Recent work on
corruption as a networked phenomenon has advanced
our understanding of how it is organized (Jancsics, 2015;
Wachs, Yasseri, Lengyel, & Kertész, 2019). Yet few studies
look at how corruption excludes political outsiders even
though exclusion has become a keymarker of corruption
(Diwan, Keefer, & Schiffbauer, 2016; Freund, Nucifora, &
Rijkers, 2014; Goldman, Rocholl, & So, 2013). Crucially,
relevant studies only look at the existence of personal
connections and their impacts rather than studying the
relationships that are implicitly missing when we talk
about corruption.
This article studies the impact of corruption on
the structure of public procurement markets and how
government turnover disrupts corruption. Corruption is
thought to be especially widespread in procurement, ow-
ing to the large sums of money involved, the complex-
ity of contracts, and discretion it lends to officials (Baldi,
Bottasso, Conti, & Piccardo, 2016). Public procurement
typically accounts for 1/3 of government spending in
OECD countries and up to 1/2 in developing economies
(Djankov, Islam, & Saliola, 2016; OECD, 2017). It also
presents a formidable set of complex legal and techni-
cal details given that it is highly regulated and many
products bought are high value and technologically com-
plex, such as highways or government IT systems. Due
to the unique characteristics and project-driven nature
of public procurement, it often allows public officials to
shape the tenders’ and contracts’ details according to
their own discretion.
First, we distinguish corrupt and non-corrupt con-
tracts using proxies capturing high risk situations. For
example, we track if a tender is not advertised or its
specifications are tailored to exclude non-favored firms.
Second, we show that such corruption risks lead to qual-
itatively different market structure around the buyer.
Compared with buyers of low corruption risk contracts,
high risk buyers have sparser local networks, indicating
that they have contracting relationships with fewer firms
than expected. Third, we examine the impact of a change
of government on these network neighborhoods. Given
our framing of corruption as a collective phenomenon,
embedded in the “organizational routines and cultural
norms” of institutions (Kim & Lee, 2019), we expect the
shock of political turnover to induce greater network
change among ‘captured’ buyers—those with high risk
and sparse network neighborhoods. Such buyers have
significantly different contractual relationships when the
government changes. This suggests electoral turnover
can profoundly impact corrupt relationships. In the long
run, polities which limit returns to corruption with fre-
quent political turnover can achieve better institutions,
as suggested by Milanovic, Hoff, and Horowitz (2010) in
the case of post-communist transitions.
We study these questions with data from the Czech
Republic and Hungary. We collect contract-level admin-
istrative data from government portals and develop in-
dicators of corruption risk. These two countries from
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) represent similar typ-
ical cases given their very comparable levels of develop-
ment (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). Their procurement
systems are similar due to the overarching EU framework.
Prior cross-country research on corruption and state cap-
ture generally grouped the two countries together, for
example as competitive clientelistic regimes, consider-
ing them as typical cases (Fazekas & Tóth, 2016; Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2015).
2. Theory
Much of the earlier scholarship on corruption has pre-
dominantly understood it as bribery, as a type of infor-
mal tax on economic transactions when companies in-
teract with bureaucrats (Knack, Biletska, & Kacker, 2017).
It emphasizes the importance of bureaucratic meritoc-
racy and discretion on quality of governance outcomes
(Dahlström, Lapuente, & Teorell, 2012). While this per-
spective on corruption certainly has its merits, it is
less applicable to contexts of institutionalized corruption
(Rose-Ackerman, 2015). An emerging literature defines
corruption in terms of access to power and public re-
sources and the impartiality of exercising public author-
ity (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015; North et al., 2009; Rothstein
& Teorell, 2008). Applying this to procurement, we de-
fine corruption in public procurement as the allocation
and performance of government contracts in violation of
prior explicit rules and principles of open and fair public
procurement to benefit a closed network while denying
access to others (Fazekas, Tóth, & King, 2016).
We draw on theory understanding competitive clien-
telistic regimes as a sub-type of limited access orders,
which determines the type and prevalence of corruption
throughout society (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). In competi-
tive clientelistic regimes such as the Czech Republic and
Hungary, electoral winners take control of the state to ex-
tract rents. The group in control benefits connected firms
through government contracts, regulation, privatization,
access to state-backed loans, etc. This creates a partisan
form of corruption by which elite groups compete for
control and enrich their allies (David-Barrett & Fazekas,
2019). Even though corruption is widespread in such
countries, there is a strong variation in the level of cor-
ruption within them (e.g., by region or sector; Charron,
Dijkstra, & Lapuente, 2015). Such a setting fundamen-
tally influences elite time horizons and the incentives to
expropriate rents with corruption increasing in the likeli-
hood of losing office (Wright, 2008).
Understanding corruption in competitive clientelis-
tic regimes as exclusion, reflecting the power of the
captor group able to dominate public procurement in
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buyer organizations, gives rise to novel empirical pre-
dictions about the impact of corruption. Corruption is
a market organising force which determines contractual
relationships, their distribution, and which actors have
access. A dominant corrupt coalition in public procure-
ment will tilt market forces to increase the market share
of companies linked to the coalition. The magnitude of
this effect depends on the strengths of corruption con-
trols such as audit institutions or courts (David-Barrett
& Fazekas, 2019) and the degree of partisanship in the
economy (Stark & Vedres, 2012). Partisan favoritism in
public procurement stands in contrast with a system of
pervasive corruption whereby large companies corrupt
all major parties to guarantee their continued access to
government contracts (a phenomenon we cannot explic-
itly model in our empirical design). Corrupt misalloca-
tion of contracts harms economic efficiency by weaken-
ing competition and the incentives to deliver on contract
(Coviello & Mariniello, 2014). Understanding corruption
as an organising force in public procurement markets at
the level of buyers, we put forward two hypotheses:
H1: Higher corruption leads to uneven distribution of
spending among suppliers on the market.
H2: Higher corruption leads to stronger exclusion of
non-favored suppliers.
The theory of competitive clientelistic or particularistic
regimes also suggests when the distribution of power
changes, for example following a change in government,
the fortunes of favored suppliers should change more
than that of their less-favored rivals. If success depends
on proximity to political power, then changes in the distri-
bution of that power ought to be reflected in the market
(Goldman et al., 2013; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). If govern-
ment accountability is effectively pursued through elec-
tions, then we should expect government turnover to
weaken the link between corruption on network struc-
ture (Eggers, 2014). However, if electoral accountability
is ineffective, government changewould only replace the
captors but leave the biased structure of procurement
markets unaltered (Fazekas & Tóth, 2016). Given the high
degree of partisanship in Hungary and to a lesser degree
in the Czech Republic, we hypothesize that:
H3: Government turnover temporarily mutes the ef-
fect of corruption on the exclusion of non-favored sup-
pliers (competitive clustering).
3. Data and Measures
3.1. Data Used
The government contracting data studied in this arti-
cle were collected from the official government pub-
lic procurement portals using automated web scrapers
and parsing algorithms extracting key fields from semi-
structured HTML code. All contracts regulated by na-
tional public procurement laws must be reported on
these portals if their value is above official thresholds.
Besides contracts below thresholds, certain contracts
may be missing such as top-secret defense contracts. By
implication, our contracting data provide a close to com-
plete picture of what governments, state owned enter-
prises, and semi-public bodies financed by the state buy
to the value of 3–7% of annual GDP. They are also very di-
verse, encompassing contracts in markets such as office
supplies, specialized legal services, road construction, or
electricity. We collected all contracts in Hungary from
2009 to 2014, and in the Czech Republic from 2006 to
2013. The time series are partially non-overlapping and
do not extend to the present because of changes in re-
porting formats, representing the maximally compara-
ble contract-level databases available for these two coun-
tries; for more details see the supplementary file.
From each contract, we extract the buyer (the is-
suer of the contract) and supplier (the firm), the num-
ber of bids submitted, the date of award, the contract
value (which we transform to Euros and adjust for infla-
tion), and several further buyer, supplier, and contract-
level variables used for calculating the Corruption Risk
Index (CRI).
3.2. Government Contracting Markets as Networks
Networks have been used to study a wide variety of phe-
nomena from the natural and social sciences (Albert &
Barabási, 2002). We represent public procurement mar-
kets as bipartite networks. When a buyer and a supplier
have a contracting relationship, we connect them by an
edge. The edge carries the total contract value, the count
of contracts, and the average corruption risk of contracts
between the buyer and supplier. Bipartite networks re-
fer to networks with two distinct classes of nodes (in
our cases buyers and suppliers) among which there
can be no edges. We visualize a toy example network
in Figure 1.
In the case of public contracting, this approach is rel-
atively new. Fazekas and Tóth (2016) established that
high corruption risk organizations are clustered in pro-
curement markets viewed as networks, indicating the
presence of state capture, and that global network mea-
sures of the market reflect centralizing trends in the
bureaucracy. Fierăscu (2017) expands on this approach
and relates local network configurations to corruption
risk across several years of Hungarian procurement. This
perspective is perhaps closest to our own, as we also
seek to relate local network information with corruption.
More generally, criminologists have long observed that il-
licit behavior leaves distinct behavior traces in relational
data (Papachristos, 2011) and that networks can provide
substantial insight on the organization of criminal gangs
(Calderoni, Brunetto, & Piccardi, 2017), high level polit-
ical corruption (Luna-Pla & Nicolas-Carlock, 2020), and
cartels (Wachs & Kertész, 2019).
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Figure 1. A network representation of an artificial toy public contracting market. Notes: The squares represent buyers and
the circles suppliers. A buyer and supplier are connected by an edge if they have a contracting relationship. The width of
the edge increases as the value of the contracts between the buyer and supplier increases. For example, suppliers a and b
are both connected to buyer X, indicating that they have won at least one contract from X. Supplier a has won substantially
more contract value from buyer X, indicated by the thickness of the edge connecting the two.
In Figure 2, we visualize the 2009 Czech and
Hungarian public procurement markets as networks. We
show only the nodes and edges connected to the largest
component of the graph. The disconnected nodes are
less than 10% of the network in both cases. We note
that even though we consider the entire market, includ-
ing contracts for hospital beds, road repair, and school
lunches, the networks are densely connected. The path
length from one randomly chosen node to another is
only six on average.
3.3. Measuring Corruption Risks Objectively: The Main
Independent Variable
Micro-level objective indicators of corruption in public
contracting are a recent development (Fazekas et al.,
2016). The online reporting of public procurement con-
tracts in several countries makes it possible to score con-
tracts for corruption risk en masse. We use an estab-
lished method of measuring corruption risk called the
CRI, which checks for certain red flags in contract meta-
data known from case studies to be linked to corrup-
tion (Pricewaterhouse Coopers, 2013;World Bank, 2009).
The CRI is an aggregate measure counting the presence
of these red flags as measured by elementary corruption
risk indicators (Fazekas&Kocsis, 2020). CRImeasures cor-
ruption risks only in competitivemarkets, that is,markets
where competition would be expected in the absence of
corruption. In practice, this means that markets where
there are only few different suppliers (less than three) in
the historical records are excluded from the analysis.
The elementary corruption risk indicators fall into
three groups: those describing red flags in the submis-
sion phase; the assessment of bids phase; and the out-
come phase (Table 1). During the submission phase, com-
panies may be blocked from participation if the call was
Figure 2. Hungarian and Czech procurement markets in 2009. Notes: Green nodes are buyers, purple nodes are suppliers.
Edges are colored red if the average CRI of contracts between the buyer and supplier in question are at least one standard
deviation above the market average.
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Table 1. Contract-level indicators of corruption risk.
Procedure phase Indicator name Indicator values
Submission Call for tender not published 0 = Call for tender published in official journal
1 = No call for tenders published in official journal
Procedure type 0 = Open procedure
1 = Non-open procedure (e.g., invitation tender)
Length of eligibility criteria Number of characters of the eligibility relative to market average
Length of advertisement period Number of days between publication of call for tenders and
submission deadline
Call for tenders modification 0 = Call for tenders not modified
1 = Call for tenders modified
Assessment Weight of non-price evaluation Sum of weights for evaluation criteria which are not related to
criteria prices or quantities
Length of decision period Number of working days between submission deadline and award
announcement
Outcome Single bidder contract 0 =More than one valid bid received
1 = One bid received
not published in the official journal, modified during the
submission period, if the procedure type was not open,
if eligibility criteria were over-determined, or if deadline
was short. Non-favored companies may still be barred
from winning a tender in the assessment phase. Non-
price or quantity criteria in the evaluation of bids give
the decision-maker discretion and limits accountability.
If the time it takes the buyer of the tender to decide on
thewinner is short, it may indicate a premediated choice.
Finally, a single-bidder outcome in a competitive market
is a strong indicator that the tender lacked competition.
The composite CRI is the arithmetic average of the
scaled elementary indicators, all falling in the 0–1 range.
Though certainly not an exhaustive index of corruption
strategies, it represents a varied collection of simple
strategies used in practice by corrupt actors.
The CRI has been shown to be significantly re-
lated to both macro and micro measures of corruption
(Charron, Dahlström, Fazekas, & Lapuente, 2017). At the
EU regional-level, average CRI has a strong negative cor-
relation with the European Quality of Government Index
(EQI, 𝜌 ∼ −.54), and a strong positive correlation with
the two subcomponents of the EQI directly measuring
corruption risk: corruption perception (𝜌 ∼ .47) and re-
ported bribery (𝜌 ∼ .59). At the contract-level, high-CRI
contracts have been shown to predict higher prices rela-
tive to cost estimates across the EU. The CRI of contracts
awarded by buyers across Europe to companies regis-
tered in tax havens is higher (Fazekas & Kocsis, 2020).
3.4. Measuring Contracting Network Structure:
Dependent Variables
We define three buyer-level measures describing market
structure: entropy, unweighted competitive clustering,
andweighted competitive clustering. Tomeasure change
over time we define buyer persistence.
Entropy: For a buyer i, pi(j) denotes the fraction of
i’s contract value awarded to supplier j. We calculate the
normed entropy of a buyer’s distribution as:
H(i) = −
∑j∈J pi(j) × log(pi(j))
log(|J|)
The normed entropy of a uniform distribution equals 1.
Entropy tends to 0 as the distribution becomes more
heterogeneous.
Unweighted competitive clustering: One important
local network measure is the clustering coefficient. In
most empirical networks, the number of connected tri-
angles is much larger than would be expected than if
the nodes were connected at random. In social networks
this phenomenon is often summarized as ‘a friend of my
friend is my friend.’ The classical clustering coefficient
of a node can be interpreted as a probability: given two
friends of the node, what is the likelihood that they are
friends too?
Bipartite networks do not contain triangles. Instead,
we consider local clustering in terms of squares. Given
the focal buyer i, we expect that those suppliers whowin
from buyers near to i to be much more likely to win from
i than suppliers more distant in the network. In a market
without favoritism, we are more likely to observe a clo-
sure phenomenon, as we do in social networks, in which
buyers contractwith suppliers adjacent to their neighbor-
ing institutions much more frequently than at random.
All other things being equal, buyers who contract with
the same suppliers have some similarity.
We visualize this probability as the dotted line edge
in Figure 3. In the context of public procurement mar-
kets, we call this probability competitive clustering.
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Qualitatively, we expect an edge between a buyer (B)
and a supplier (S) to be more likely if the supplier (S)
competes with other suppliers (S’) which serve the buyer
(B), at other buyers (B’). We argue that sharing a supplier
implies that the two buyers have some similarity, be it in
terms of geography, technology, or scale, and that this
similarity will manifest in the sharing of other suppliers.
p
Figure 3. Competitive clustering. Notes: Unweighted
competitive clustering of the focal buyer, visualized as a
black square, is defined as the probability of the dashed
edge existing given all other edges in the graph. A sec-
ond buyer, the white square, and the focal buyer both
contract with the supplier on the right. This similar-
ity between the two buyers suggests that if the white
buyer also contracts with the buyer on the left, then
the focal buyer is much more likely to also contract with
that buyer.
Mathematically, we define the competitive clustering of
a buyer as the number of four-step paths, Ci(4), starting
and ending at that buyer, divided by the paths of length
three, Pi(3), starting at the buyer:
CCi =
Ci(4)
Pi(3)
This is a local version of the measure introduced by
Robins and Alexander (2004). It is related to the square
clustering measure of Lind, Gonzalez, and Herrmann
(2005), which calculates the probability of observing
edges between neighbors and second order neighbors
of the focal node. It can also be contrasted with Opsahl’s
(2013) clustering measure. In Figure 4, we calculate two
examples of the competitive clustering around a hypo-
thetical buyer.
Weighted competitive clustering: As edge weights,
encoding the total contract value and hence the strength
of a contracting relationship between a supplier and a
buyer, play an important role in our networks, we pro-
pose a second measure extending competitive cluster-
ing to incorporate edge weights. The measure should
equal 1 for a buyer if its competitive clustering is 1 and
the weights on all edges are homogeneous. We again
compare the ratio of four-cycles to three-paths. We mul-
tiply each path of length four by the geometric mean
of its scaled edge weights: This quantity is maximized if
the edge weights are identical. As the weights tend to
unity, the measure converges to the unweighted com-
petitive clustering measure. Mathematically, count each
four-cycle centered at the focal buyer i weighted by the
geometric mean of the scaled weights in the cycle:
CCi =
Ci(4)
Pi(3)
× 􏾜
j,k,l∈Ci
(wijwjkwklwil)1/4
As contract values have great heterogeneity both across
the network and locally, we scale the weights dynami-
cally for each buyer by dividing by the maximum edge
weight in its 3-node neighborhood.
Persistence: We define buyer network change over
time by measuring the correlation of its contract award
profile across years. Specifically, we consider all suppli-
ers winning contracts from the buyer in either year A or
B or both, and create two vectors: one encoding the dis-
tribution of contract value in year A, the other the same
for year B. We call the Pearson-correlation of these two
vectors the (A, B)-persistence (Nicosia et al., 2013) of a
buyer. (A, B)-persistence of a buyer is 1 if the buyer’s
contract awards are distributed with the same relative
contract values to the same suppliers in years A and B.
Figure 4. The competitive clustering of two focal buyers. Notes: The first buyer has a dense local network—there are many
paths of length four starting and ending at the focal buyer. Hence, the first buyer has a high competitive clustering of
4/6 = 2/3. The second buyer has a sparse local network and a competitive clustering of 0: no path of length four starting
from the black buyer that returns to that buyer.
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(A, B)-persistence can attain a minimal value of −1 in the
case that the issuance of a buyer goes to a completely
different set of suppliers in year A compared to year B.
4. Methods
4.1. Case Selection
Hungary and the Czech Republic represent comparable,
typical cases given their very similar levels of develop-
ment, prevalence of corruption, regulatory framework,
and government turnovers (Seawright & Gerring, 2008).
Both countries have GDP per capita slowly converging
to the EU average (reaching between 65–75% by the
early 2010s). They also score close to the average of the
Corruption Perception Index for CEE EU member states
(53.25 in 2013) with scores 48 and 54 respectively on a
scale between 0 (corrupt) and 100 (clean; Transparency
International, 2013). Objective corruption proxies in pub-
lic procurement such as share of single bidder tenders
on competitive markets are very similar: 24% and 28%
of contracts received a single bid in the Czech Republic
and Hungary, respectively in 2009–2014 (Fazekas &
Kocsis, 2020). Prior research on corruption and state
capture generally grouped the two countries together.
For instance, both are considered competitive clien-
telistic regimes in which political winners use their of-
fice to reward cronies by redistributing public resources
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2015). Despite these similarities, the
countries have diverged recently. Hungary’s institutional
quality and corruption level have deteriorated since 2010
(Bánkuti, Halmai, & Scheppele, 2012), while the Czech
Republic has remained stable, broadly speaking. Public
procurement regulatory and administrative systems are
very similar in the two countries given the overarching
EU framework of the Public Procurement Directives, sim-
ilarities in national legislation outside of the Directives,
and largely identical administrative systems including
electronic procurement portals. Both countries experi-
enced considerable government turnovers in our ob-
servation period, with larger swings between parties in
Hungary than in the Czech Republic.
4.2. Empirical Models and Identification
To formally test our hypotheses, we employ three scaled
dependent variables at the buyer/year level: i) entropy
which (H1); ii) competitive closure (H2); and iii) weighted
competitive clustering (H1 andH2). For each country and
each dependent variable, we run two regression mod-
els: a pooled OLS model and a buyer fixed-effects panel
model. We consider only those buyers with at least five
contracts in our data set to exclude the smaller organiza-
tions whose behavior is noisier. We find similar results,
documented in Appendix A in the Supplementary File,
when we restrict to buyers with at least 10 contracts. In
both cases, the dependent variables are calculated on
the full networks.
The panel data equation we estimated is:
yi,t = 𝛽1 × CRIi,t + 𝛽2Xi,t + 𝛼i + ei,t
Where yi,t is the dependent variable observed for buyer i
at time t, CRIi,t is our main independent variable, the
measure of corruption risks, Xi,t is the matrix of control
variables, 𝛼i is the time-invariant individual buyer effect,
and ei,t is the error term. The matrix of control variables
contained the following indicators:
• The log of number of contracts awarded by the
buyer in that year;
• The log of the total value of contracts awarded by
the buyer in that year;
• An election year dummy: 1 if the year in question
had a parliamentary election in that country re-
sults in a change in government;
• The interaction of CRI and the election year
dummy;
• Year dummies;
• Buyer type, distinguishing between local and cen-
tral government institutions, provided by the pub-
lic procurement registry (only in pooled OLS);
• Buyer location, based on the NUTS-II classification
(only in pooled OLS);
• Buyer sector (Hungary-only), describing the pri-
mary sector of the buyer, provided by the public
procurement registry (only in pooled OLS).
In the absence of an experimental setting, the buyer-
level fixed effects panel data models provide a reliable
and valid estimate of the hypothesized causal effects
for several reasons. First, they control for unobserved
organizational characteristics such as spending prefer-
ences influencing supplier composition (e.g., taste for
high quality goods). Second, year dummies control for
common shocks occurring over time separately in each
of the countries. Third, indicators of time varying orga-
nizational characteristics such as total value and num-
ber of contracts awarded and sectoral composition of
spending control of obvious confounding factors simulta-
neously determining market structure as well as corrup-
tion risks. Fourth, our analysis is based on the full sample
of government contracting activities barring few specific
spending lines such as defense contractswith national se-
curity implications. This means that sampling bias poses
little threat to identification, a challenge which often
limits the generalizability of experimental and quasi-
experimental designs. Fifth, the corruption and network
measures are constructed from different micro variables
on different measurement levels minimizing the risk of
double-counting the same phenomena on both sides of
the equation. We only consider contracts awarded on
competitive markets, defined as having at least three ac-
tive suppliers (e.g., monopolistic markets determined by
technology do not bias results).
Our regressions are run using the plm package of
the R programming language (Croissant & Millo, 2008).
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To account for possible cross-sectional correlation in the
errors, we report panel-corrected standard errors, fol-
lowing Beck and Katz (1995). As a check against the po-
tential non-independence of observations in the con-
tracting network, we simulate p-values using Monte
Carlo random permutations; see Appendix B in the
Supplementary File (Good, 2006). Finally, in Appendix C
in the Supplementary File we show the results of the
competitive clustering models with year fixed-effects in-
cluded to control for temporal shocks.
5. Results
5.1. Uneven Spending Distribution: Entropy
With regards to H1, we find limited evidence that CRI im-
pacts buyer entropy in either country, shown in Table 2.
Though both pooled OLS models show a statistically sig-
nificant negative effect of CRI on entropy as expected,
the more reliable fixed-effects panel data models do not
support this conclusion.
The lack of clear support for H1 is perhaps not surpris-
ing, given, for example, the recent research on political-
economic networks in Hungary suggesting that missing
business connections are drivingmarket outcomes (Stark
&Vedres, 2012). Our dependent variable in thesemodels
is entropy amongst the winners of the buyer’s awarded
contracts, which is a biased measure of corruption as
it neglects those suppliers which have been totally ex-
cluded from themarket. This bias increases as total exclu-
sion becomes the dominant effect of corruption. Hence,
we now check models in which the dependent variable
explicitly quantifies exclusion.
5.2. Excluding Non-Favored Suppliers: Competitive
Clustering
This analysis, summarized in Table 3, leads to three no-
table insights. First, with regards to H2, our regression
models provide clear support for our hypothesized em-
pirical relationship. In both countries, bothmodel specifi-
cations show a significant negative relationship between
CRI and competitive clustering. This means that corrup-
tion in both countries leads to exclusion in buyers’ lo-
cal markets. Contrasted with the finding that entropy
and CRI are unrelated, this relationship indicates that
corruption in these countries manifests as missing local
connections in contracting networks. Such interpretation
bodes well with macro-institutional accounts of compet-
itive clientelistic regimes.
Second, we also find that in all models, effect sizes
are larger in Hungary than in the Czech Republic: The
impact of corruption on market structure is roughly
1.5–2 times larger in Hungary. Note that all variables are
standardized.
Third, the interaction term between CRI and the elec-
tion year dummy is not significant in either model, indi-
cating that the there is no difference in the relationship
Table 2. Pooled OLS and buyer fixed-effects regression models predicting buyer entropy.
Dependent variable: Buyer entropy, ≥ 5 contracts
Hungary Czech Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRI −.009 ° .002 −.014 * −.004
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.006)
Election year dummy −.038 *** −.016 −.012 −.005
(.011) (.010) (.011) (.010)
Buyer number of contracts (log) .044 *** .077 *** .044 *** .057 ***
(.006) (.007) (.005) (.006)
Buyer contract value (log) −.053 *** −.103 *** −.045 *** −.096 ***
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.004)
CRI, election year interaction −.029 ** −.018 ° −.016 −.022
(.010) (.011) (0.16) (.015)
Constant 1.285 *** 1.222 ***
(.045) (.043)
Model Pooled OLS Buyer, year Pooled OLS Buyer, year
Fixed Effects Fixed Effects
Type, location, sector + dummies Yes — Yes —
Observations 3,657 3,657 2,704 2,704
R2 .145 .248 .115 .209
F statistic 20.448 *** 121.052 *** 18.312 *** 95.737 ***
(degrees of freedom (df = 5; 1838) (df = 19; 2684) (df = 5; 1813)
[df] = 30; 3626)
Notes: We report panel-corrected standard errors. ° p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; + sector only available for Hungary.
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Table 3. Pooled OLS and buyer fixed-effects regression models predicting buyer competitive clustering.
Dependent variable: Buyer competitive clustering, ≥ 5 contracts
Hungary Czech Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRI −.072 *** −.046 *** −.024 *** −.029 ***
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.006)
Election year dummy −.023 * .031 ** −.013 −.028 **
(.011) (.010) (.010) (.009)
Buyer number of contracts (log) .137 *** .102 *** .158 *** .148 ***
(.011) (.007) (.006) (.006)
Buyer contract value (log) −.015 *** .002 .003 .004
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.004)
CRI, election year interaction −.021 * −.002 .007 .005
(.010) (.010) (0.14) (.014)
Constant .029 −.137 ***
(.050) (.047)
Model Pooled OLS Buyer, year FE Pooled OLS Buyer, year FE
Type, location, sector + dummies Yes — Yes —
Observations 3,657 3,657 2,704 2,704
R2 .424 .192 .463 .306
F statistic 99.934 *** 87.276 *** 121.604 *** 159.898 ***
(df = 30; 3626) (df = 5; 1838) (df = 19; 2684) (df = 5; 1813)
Notes: We report panel-corrected standard errors. ° p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; + sector only available for Hungary.
between corruption risk and competitive clustering dur-
ing years that see a change in government compared to
those without. This indicates that, if changes in govern-
ment result in a significant change in buyer behavior, it
is not observable within the same year of the change in
government. This test does not lend support to H3.
To further bridge the different degrees of mar-
ket structure reconfiguration resulting from corrup-
tion, that is, explore the overlaps between H1 and
H2, we also consider weighted competitive clustering
as an outcome variable. Weighted competitive cluster-
ing measures both the exclusion and heterogeneity in
the observed contract value distributions, hence aims
to reflect both H1 and H2. We find results similar
to the unweighted competitive clustering case across
all four models (Table 4), suggesting that the un-
weighted competitive clustering results are robust to
edge weight heterogeneity.
Despite the insignificant relationship between CRI
and entropy, the significant relationship between CRI
andweighted competitive clustering lends some support
to H1. We posit that in markets where non-favored sup-
pliers command unique skills and capacities, their total
exclusion would be counterproductive even if total exclu-
sion is typically the norm. Practically, a tender tailored to
a specific supplier may be won by an outsider. The red
flags of the CRI are strategies of corrupt contract alloca-
tion; they do not secure the tender for favored suppliers.
How can we relate this to a concrete market out-
come? A one standard deviation increase in CRI is approx-
imately the same as having one more red flag, on aver-
age. In the Hungarian case, this means that if a buyer has
one more red flag on average, its competitive clustering
will be half a standard deviation lower. Ceteris paribus,
a one standard deviation decrease in competitive clus-
tering means having three fewer suppliers. In Hungary,
an additional red flag on average means that a buyer
contracts with 1.5 fewer suppliers in a given year. The
same analysis in the Czech Republic indicates that an ad-
ditional red flag on average means around 1 fewer sup-
plier per year. The average buyer in each country has
around 10 suppliers per year. In other words, an addi-
tional red flag means roughly a 10–15% decrease in the
number of suppliers a buyer contracts with.
5.3. Government Change: Captured Buyers
and Persistence
Having established the link between CRI and the topol-
ogy of a buyer’s network neighborhood via competitive
clustering, we now return to H3 by checking the im-
pact of government change using issuer persistence as
dependent variable. We define buyers as captured if
they have above average CRI and below average com-
petitive clustering in a year and non-captured otherwise.
Contrasting captured and non-captured buyers’ persis-
tence throughout periods of government change directly
tests H3. When governments change and bureaucrats
are replaced, we expect captured buyers to have less per-
sistent issuance.
We continue to use an annual time frame and con-
sider changes in buyer behavior across years.We analyze
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Table 4. Pooled OLS and buyer fixed-effects regression models predicting buyer weighted competitive clustering.
Dependent variable: Buyer weighted competitive clustering, ≥ 5 contracts
Hungary Czech Republic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CRI −.064 *** −.047 *** −.012 * −.014 *
(.005) (.005) (.006) (.006)
Election year dummy .016 .020 ° .020 ° .005
(.011) (.010) (.010) (.010)
Buyer number of contracts (log) .094 *** .070 *** .090 *** .080 ***
(.006) (.007) (.005) (.006)
Buyer contract value (log) −.003 .010 * .017 *** .021 ***
(.003) (.004) (.003) (.004)
CRI, election year interaction .001 .015 −.005 −.015
(.010) (.011) (0.15) (.014)
Constant −.035 −.207 ***
(.046) (.044)
Model Pooled OLS Buyer FE Pooled OLS Buyer FE
Type, location, sector + dummies Yes — Yes —
Observations 3,657 3,657 2,704 2,704
R2 .315 .114 .300 .142
F statistic 55.585 *** 47.269 *** 60.461 *** 59.970 ***
(df = 30; 3626) (df = 5; 1838) (df = 19; 2684) (df = 5; 1813)
Notes: We report panel-corrected standard errors. ° p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; + sector only available for Hungary.
pairs that are two years apart to capture the effect of a
change in government in the intermediate year. For ex-
ample, we are interested in the (2009, 2011)-persistence
of Hungarian buyers, as 2010 saw a change in govern-
ment. Hence, we will refer to two-year difference persis-
tence simply as persistence.
To test H3, we investigate buyer persistence for each
country in greater detail. We group captured and non-
captured buyers and plot the distributions of persis-
tences across regular years and change of government
years in Figure 5. Comparing the persistences of cap-
tured vs non-captured buyers across normal and politi-
cally volatile years reveals a clear picture in line with H3.
In both countries, the persistence of captured buyers is
lower than that of non-captured buyers in periods with
government change while differences in persistence are
statistically indistinguishable in periods without govern-
ment change. The effect in Hungary is larger than in the
Czech Republic.
We verify the significance of the observed differ-
ences using a permutation test (Good, 2006). We ran-
domly shuffle the capture category labels 1000 times and
Two Year Issuer Persistence
Change of Government in Intervening Year
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Figure 5. Comparison of persistence of captured and non-captured buyers across years with and without government
change. Notes: Captured buyers are defined as those with high CRI and low competitive clustering. Persistence is defined
as the correlation of the buyer’s issuance of contract value to suppliers over two years (e.g., 2009 to 2011).
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recalculate the difference in persistence between cap-
tured and non-captured buyers. We calculate a p-value
by counting the number of times the randomized cap-
tured vs non-captured persistence difference is less than
the real difference, that is, we compare the observed em-
pirical relationship to a truly random distribution of the
capture label.
In Table 5, we see that captured buyers are signifi-
cantly less persistent across the 2010 Hungarian change
in government. They are also significantly less persis-
tent from 2012 to 2014. The effect size of buyer cap-
ture is by far the largest from 2009 to 2011, bridging the
change of government in 2010. It is also significant, albeit
with a smaller effect size across the 2010–2012 period.
This may indicate that it takes the corrupt elites some
time capture buyer institutions, and that the rewiring of
contracting networks lags turnover. Captured Hungarian
buyers have 38%weaker correlation in their issuance pro-
files across the change in government than their non-
captured peers.
In the Czech Republic, we also see the strongest
negative effect of capture on persistence in the years
across the change in government in 2010: 2008–2010,
2009–2011, and 2010–2012 in line with our hypotheses.
Like for Hungary, the relationship is significant for an ex-
tended period, again suggesting that the capture of insti-
tutions takes time. We also show histograms of the ran-
domized persistences and the actual persistence for each
year in Appendix E in the Supplementary File.
These findings support H3: Government turnover has
an impact on corrupt contacting networks. They provide
evidence of politically-driven state capture among pub-
lic buyers in both countries and demonstrate the value
of using both micro-level risk indicators and network fea-
tures to relate corruption in procurement to the politi-
cal cycle.
6. Conclusion
This article analyzes the connection between corruption
andmarket structure in public procurementmarkets.We
use a network framework to test qualitative hypotheses
from the literature on corruption in a quantitative set-
ting. Specifically, we find strong evidence at the micro-
level that corruption in public procurement is predomi-
nantly about the exclusion of non-favored suppliers. This
is in line with theories of corruption as particularism, or
the preferential treatment of groups by the state. Back-
of-the-envelope calculations suggest that at the margin,
if a buyer awards contracts with an additional red flag on
average, it will contract with 10–15% fewer unique sup-
pliers. These missing connections are the manifestation
of corrupt behavior distorting market structure.
We validate the political nature of the inverse rela-
tionship between corruption and competitive clustering
by observing that buyers with high CRI and low com-
petitive clustering, which we refer to as captured, see
significantly larger changes in their contracting relation-
ships across government changes than other buyers. In
Hungary, the correlation of contract awards of a captured
buyer across an election year is 38% weaker than a non-
captured buyer. In the Czech Republic, this relationship
is 21%.
We suggest that our work has wider implications.
For the literature on corruption and state capture, our
findings provide empirical evidence about the mecha-
nisms of corrupt allocation of government resources. For
policymakers, our approach suggests that networks can
visualize clusters of corruption risk. Simply looking at
networks can reveal the structure of buyer-supplier re-
lationships in a way that traditional statistical analysis
cannot. The network framework also suggests a novel
approach to corruption detection: looking for missing
edges. Our article alsomakes the broader point that elec-
toral contestation and power sharing can mitigate cor-
rupt market distortions even in systematically corrupt
places. Even if corruption is widespread, its power to
reconfigure market relationships and impose economic
costs onmarkets depends on political constraints. Hence,
strengthening competitive democratic process can curb
corruption at least its most extensive market distort-
ing effects. Our article also suggests that corruption in
Table 5. Hungarian buyer two-year persistence permutation test: Difference between captured and non-captured buyers
and significance of the difference according to a label-permuted nonparametric test of differences.
Years Country Observed difference % difference p-value
2009, 2011 Hungary −0.151 −38% <.001 ***
2010, 2012 Hungary −0.051 −14% .0013 ***
2011, 2013 Hungary 0.014 +4% .7559
2012, 2014 Hungary −0.044 −12% .0198 **
2006, 2008 Czech Republic 0.004 +2% 0.57
2007, 2009 Czech Republic −0.030 −11% 0.112
2008, 2010 Czech Republic −0.045 −17% 0.029 **
2009, 2011 Czech Republic −0.052 −21% 0.007 ***
2010, 2012 Czech Republic −0.047 −16% 0.020 **
2011, 2013 Czech Republic 0.007 +2% 0.639
Note: *** < .01, ** < .05 , * < .10.
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procurement can be viewed through the lens of com-
petition policy, broadening the scope of potential anti-
corruption stakeholders (Luz & Spagnolo, 2017). Finally,
given the strong correlation between market distortions
and government turnover, introducing contracting prac-
tices which cut across electoral cycles could weaken
elected politicians’ capacity to exploit public procure-
ment for partisan gain. This could be achieved by, for ex-
ample, using long mandatory guarantee clauses or multi-
year service contracts spanning across electoral cycles.
We also identify several drawbacks to our approach.
First, we consider only two countries from CEE which are
likely not representative of the wider set of EU countries.
Second, our network measure of competitive clustering
is a simple measure and we posit a straightforward rela-
tionship between local network density and corruption.
This problem is compounded by the fact that our data
does not contain information on the individuals owning
or benefiting from the suppliers. Hungarian and Czech
media are full of examples of suspected corrupt oligarchs
with many companies and affiliations. Third, we could
not offer a direct measure of social costs of corruption
arising due to market distortions. Further work could ex-
plicitly estimatemarket prices and social costs under sce-
narios of exclusionary as well as competitive corruption.
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